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UNITED STATES v. DAVIS: WHAT REMAINS OF SECTION
302(b) (1)'
Section 302(b) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 19541 provides
that a distribution in redemption of stock will qualify for capital gain
treatment if it is "not essentially equivalent to a dividend." Attempts to
determine when a distribution coupled with a stock redemption is "es-
sentially equivalent to a dividend" have been characterized as "vexing," 2
"9exasperating," 3 and "mghtmarish." I Most of the problems under this
section have arisen in those courts which consider the business purpose
of a redemption to be a relevant factor in determining dividend equiva-
lency 5 The use of the business purpose test forced the courts to apply
numerous factors of varying sigificance to the many complex fact sit-
uations presented by the financial operations of corporations. With the
decision of United States v. Davis,6 the Supreme Court injected a large
measure of certainty into what was once an extremely confused and
tangled area of the tax law by holding that the business purpose of a
stock redemption is irrelevant in determining dividend equivalency 7
United States v. Davis involved the redemption by Macklin Davis of
non-voting preferred stock which he had purchased to enable the cor-
1. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 302(b) (1) [hereinafter cited as Code].
2. Bradbury v. Comm'r, 298 F.2d 111, 114 (ist Cir. 1962).
3. Thomas G. Lewis, 35 T.C. 71, 76 (1960).
4. United States v. Fewell, 255 F.2d 496,499 (5th Cir. 1958).
5. Under INT. REv. CODE of 1939, § 115(g), the predecessor of section 302, the business
purpose of a redemption was a factor to be considered m determining whether a dis-
tribution was essentially equivalent to a dividend. Flanagan v. Helvering, 116 F.2d 937
(D.C. Cir. 1940). Many courts have found that the criteria used to deterrmne dividend
equivalence under the 1939 Code are still applicable to like determinations under section
302(b) (1) of the 1954 Code. E.g., Davis v. United States, 274 F Supp. 466 (MD. Tenn.
1967), aff'd 408 F.2d 1139 (6th Cir. 1969); William K. Edmister, 46 T.C. 651 (1966),
aff'd 391 F.2d 584 (6th Cit. 1968); Kerr v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. 723 (1962), aff'd 326 F.2d
225 (9th Cir. 1964); United States v. Carey, 289 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1961). The second
circuit and the leading commentator on the area have adopted the view that the business
purpose of a redemption is irrelevant under section 302(b) (1). Levin v. Comm'r, 385
F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1967); Hasbrook v. United States, 343 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1965); B.
BITTKER & J. EusricE, FEDERAL INcOmE TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 291
(2d ed. 1966). The strongest reason for not considering the business purpose in mak-
ing a determination under section 302 is given by B. BrrrKER & J. EusTIcE, supra, at 293.
They maintain that since section 346 was enacted to cover redemption "characterized
solely by what happens at the corporate level," the business purpose test is no longer
applicable under section 302 (b) (1).
6. 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
7. Id. at 312.
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poration to qualify for a government loan negotiated through the Re-
construction Finance Corporation. At the time of the purchase, Davis,
who owned 50 percent of the corporation's common stock, and the other
50 percent common stockholder, E. B. Bradley, agreed that the preferred
stock would be redeemed when it was no longer needed. When the loan
was finally paid, Davis redeemed his preferred stock for the $25,000 pur-
chase price. In the interim Davis had purchased Bradley's shares of
common stock and had transferred 75 percent of the outstanding com-
mon shares equally among his wife, son, and daughter. Davis, in his tax
return, treated the redemption as capital transaction; the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue characterized it as a dividend. The district court"
and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circut 9 felt that the business pur-
pose of the transaction precluded a finding of dividend equivalency The
Supreme Court reversed.
APPLICATION OF THE ATTRIBUTION RULES
As a first step in its decision, the Court held that the attribution rules
of section 318 are to be applied in makmg a determination under section
302 (b) (1) 10 This holding resolved a question upon which tax lawyers
and scholars had speculated for many years. 1 Against the position taken
by the Daws Court it has been argued that while section 302 (c) (1) states
that the attribution rules of section 318 apply "in determining the owner-
ship of stock for the purposes of this section," 12 the intent of section
302 (c) (1) is to apply attribution rules only to those subsections which
contain an explicit reference to stock ownership.' 3 In reaching a con-
trary conclusion, the Court stated that to rule otherwise would nullify
sections 302(b) (2) and 302(b) (3) 1" These sections qualify for capital
gain treatment those redemptions which substantially reduce a stock-
holder's voting power or completely terminate his interest in the cor-
poration. The Court reasoned that "if a transaction failed to qualify
under one of those sections [302(b) (2) or 302(b) (3)] solely because
8. Davis v. United States, 274 F Supp. 466 (M.D. Tenn. 1967).
9. Davis v. United States, 408 F.2d 1139 (6th Cir. 1969).
10. 397 U.S. at 307
11. See B. BIrTaKER & J. EUsnncE, supra note 5, at 292 n.32; Cohen, Redemptions of Stock
Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 739, 758-59 (1955); Plow-
den-Wardlaw, Constructive Ownership Under the 1954 Internal Rvenue Code, 26 FoRD-
HAM L. REv. 441, 458-61 (1957).
12. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 302(c) (1)
13. 397 U.S. at 307
14. Id.
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of the attribution rules, it would according to taxpayer's argument, none-
theless qualify under § 302 (b) (1)." '5 Since Congress expressly applied
the attribution rules to the tests of disproportionate redemption and
termination of interest, it could 'not have intended to render the effect
of this attribution meaningless by not applying the same rules to section
302(b)(1) Although the position adopted by the Court has been sub-
jected to criticism by various commentators,' 6 it was clearly the major-
ity view prior to the Davis decision.17 After concluding that the attribu-
tion rules are to be applied in determining ownership under section
302 (b) (1), the Court found that Davis "must be deemed the owner of all
1,000 shares of the company's common stock." 18 (Emphasis supplied).
While the plain language of the statute supports the Court's holding,
neither the decision nor the statute should be construed to prevent fu-
ture determinations that a distribution is not equivalent to a dividend
where family estrangement would make strict applications of the rules
inappropriate.19
BUSINESS PURPOSE TEST
The Davis decision leaves no doubt that in the future the business pur-
pose of a stock redemption will be irrelevant in determining whether the
redemption is "essentially equivalent to a dividend."
The lower courts had previously adopted two basic approaches in de-
termining the relevance of the business purpose of the questioned trans-
action: the strict net effect test,20 under which the only relevant con-
15. Id.
16. Comm. on Taxation, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Bar Association
Explains Weak Spots in Corporate Sections of 1954 Code, 2 J. TAX. 322, 324 (1955);
Cohen, supra note 11, at 758-59; Laikin, Stock Redemptions: Section 302 and 318, 14th
N.Y.U. ANN. INST. FED. TAx. 671, 686-87 (1956); Rasman, Stock Redemptions Under
Section 302 of the 1954 Code, 35 TAxEs 355, 362 (1957).
17. Levin v. Comm'r, 385 F.2d 521, 526-27 (2d Cir. 1967); Comm'r v. Berenbaum, 369
F.2d 337, 342 (10th Cir. 1966); Ballenger v. Umted States, 301 F.2d 192, 199 (4th Cir.
1962); Bradbury v. Comm'r, 298 F.2d 111, 116-117 (ist Cir. 1962). This is also the posi-
ton taken by the Internal Revenue Service, Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1960). But see,
Perry S. Levin, 47 T.C. 129 (1966), where the Tax Court without giving a reason chose
to ignore the attribution rules in a section 302(b) (1) case.
18. 397 U.S. at 307
19. But see, The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARV. L. REv. 236 n.15 (1970) (ad-
vancing the view that United States v. Davis precludes an exception to attribution based
on the estrangement doctrine). See also 2 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, FEMERAL INCOME,
G=r AND EsTrATE TAxATiON § 24.02A(5) (1970); McAndrews, Supreme Court's Davis
Decision: Does it do away 'with the 302(b)(1) Redemption?, 32 J. TAX. 328, 329 (1970).
20. E.g., Hasbrook v. United States, 343 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1965); Himmel v. Comm'r,
338 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1964); Ballenger v. Umted States, 301 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1962);
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sideraton was whether the redemption resulted in a pro rata distribu-
tion; and the flexible net effect test,21 under which the courts looked to
the motives of the taxpayer in order to determine whether a redemption
'was actually a tax avoidance scheme. In adopting the strict net effect
xest, the Court relied on legislative history which is inconclusive at
best.. The taxpayer argued that under the 1939 Code, business purpose
-was relevant in most courts2 3 and the re-enactment of the statute in the
1954 Code was accompanied by a Senate Report which stated: "In gen-
,eral, under .[ 302 (b) ] your committee intends to incorporate into the
bill existing law as to whether or not a reduction is esgentially eqiuva-
lent to a dividend under section 11S(g) (1) of the '1939 Code." 24 The
Government relied on a portion of the same report, which stated that
the inquiry under 302(b) (1) "will be directed solely to the question of
whether or not-the transaction by its nature may properly be character-
ized as a sale of stock by the redeermng shareholder to the corporal-
Ferro v. Comm'r, 242 F.2d 838 (3d Cir. 1957). This is the test which the Internal Rev -
nue Service considers the proper test under section 302(b) (1). Rev. Rul. 57-353, 1957-2
Ctm. BuLL. 223.
21. This.test was used by a majority of the courts. Davis v. United States, 408 F.2d
1139 (6th Cir. 1969); Bloch v. United States, 386 F.2d 839 (5th Cit. 1968); Comrn'r v.
Berenbaum, 369 F.2d 337 (10th Cit. 1966); Taberty v. Comm'r, 354 F.2d 422 (9th Cit.
1965); Heman v. Comm'r, 283 F.2d 227 (8th Cit. 1960); Keefe v. Cote, 213 F.2d 651 (1st
Cir. 1954); Joe L. Smith, Jr., 49 T.C. 476 (1968).
While Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1960) indicates that in the case of a pro-rata re-
4emprion the Service will not usually recognize any exception to the strict net effect test,
it.did acquiesce in the result of Joe L. Smith, Jr., 49 T.C. 476 (1968), 1968-2 CuM. BULt.
3. In Rev. Rul. 68-547, 1968-2 Cum. Butt.. 123; Rev. Rul. 56-183, 1956-1 CuM. BUtt. 161;
the Service noted that certain redemptions were motivated by a valid business purpose.
22. While the Court appears to adopt the strict net effect test, its requirement of a
"meaningful reduction of the shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation"
may well foreclose the use of the comparative dividend test, wluch looks at the distribu-
tion to determine if the shareholders would have received identical payments if the re-
demption had been a dividend. See Himmel v. Comm'r, 338 F.2d 815 (2d Cit. 1954),;
McGinty v. Comm'r, 325 F.2d 820 (2d Cir. 1963); Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d
192 (4th Cit. 1962); TAx COORDINATOR, Bi-Weekly Alert, Mar. 26, 1970, at 7
23. E.g., United States v. Fewell, 255 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1958) (dictum); Keefe v. Cote
213 F.2d 651 (1st Cir. 1954); Flanagan v. Helvering, 116 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (This
was the leading case, in which Associate Justice Vinson, who later became Chief Justice
of the United States, listed the absence of a tax avoidance motive as one of several fac-
tors to be considered); Bains v. United States, 289 F.2d 644 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
24. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 233 (1954). Judge Dawson of the Tax Court
in his dissent to J. Milton Sorem, 40 T.C. 206, 220 (1963), rev'd 334 F.2d 275 (10th Cit.
1964) said that the business purpose of a redemption is the only relevant consideration
under section 302(b) (1). He maintains that the legislative history of section 302(b) (1)
establishes that the section is not in any sense concerned with whether a redemption is
pro rata.
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tion." 25 The Government further argued that a sale implied a reduction
of ownership and therefore the existence of such a reduction was the
sole test.26 The Court, while noting that the legislative history was not
free from doubt,27 adopted the Government's argument that if the sole
inquiry was whether the redemption could be characterized as a sale,
then "Congress was apparently rejecting past court decisions that had
also considered factors indicating the presence or absence of a tax-avoid-
ance motive." 2 This conclusion was supported by a statement in the
Senate Report that the presence or absence of earnings was immaterial
in determining whether a redemption could be characterized as a sale.2 9
Since the absence of earnings and profits would preclude any tax liabil-
ity in a transaction that is "essentially equivalent to a dividend," ob-
viously the presence or absence of tax avoidance motive is not material.
After deciding that Congress had not intended for the business pur-
pose of a transaction to be a relevant factor in determining dividend
equivalence under section 302(b) (1), Justice Marshall stated that "to
qualify for preferred treatment under that section, a redemption must
result in a meaningful reduction of the shareholder's proportionate in-
terest in the corporation." 30 It is tautological to assert that under this
test redemptions can never qualify for favorable treatment in the one-
man corporation situation.
This sweeping decision, which strikes down the flexible net effect test
that had been adopted by six circuits and the Tax Court,3 ' was not neces-
sary to the resolution of the case. In keeping with its own doctrine of
deciding cases on the narrowest possible grounds, the Court could have
reached the same result either by denying the suitability of the business
purpose of this particular transaction or by finding that the motivation
for the redemption was a stockholder purpose and not a corporation pur-
pose.32 Perhaps the most persuasive approach available to the Court, and
one which it apparently discarded,3 3 would have been a separation of
the purpose of issuing the stock from the purpose for redeeming the
25. S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 24, at 234.
26. See McAndrews, supra note 19, at 330.
27. 397 U.S. at 311.
28. Id.
29. S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 24, at 234.
30. 397 U.S. at 313.
31. See cases cited note 21 supra.
32. See 2 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, supra note 19, at § 24.02(3).
33. 397 U.S. at 307 n.9.
[Vol. 13.202
UNITED STATES V DAVIS
stock, thus allowing a finding that while the issuance had a valid business
purpose there was no sufficient business purpose for the redemption. 4
The principal virtue in the sweeping nature of the Daws decision, al-
though it is based on inconclusive and contradictory legislative history,
is the simplification of an extremely confused and complex body of case
law However, this virtue will not be appreciated by Macklin Davis and
others similarly situated who loaned money to corporations in the form
of a stock purchase and now find that they cannot withdraw their funds
without receiving their capital as dividend income.
WHAT TYPES OF REDEMPTION REMAIN UNDER SECTION 302(b) (1)7
In his dissent to United States v. Daws, Justice Douglas stated that the
Court's decision "effectively cancels § 302(b) (1) from the Code." "
While the decision certainly will have a significant effect on the finan-
cial decisions of those owning shares in close corporations, 0 it has limited,
but not eliminated, the opportunity to qualify a redemption under sec-
34. The fourth and tenth circuits have held that a valid business purpose for the is-
suance of stock cannot be converted into a valid business purpose for its redemption.
Comm'r v. Berenbaum, 369 F.2d 337, 341 (10th Cir. 1966); Ballenger v. United States,
301 F.2d 192, 199 (4th Cir. 1961). However, the lower court in deciding the Dams case
held that the redemption was simply the last contemplated step of the original business
purpose. Davis v. United States, 408 F.2d 1139, 1144 (6th Cir. 1969). Accord, Cobb v.
Callan Court Co., 274 F.2d 532, 538 (5th Cir. 1960); Keefe v. Cote, 213 F.2d 651, 657 (1st
Cir. 1954). In Conm'r v. Berenbaunz, supra, just as in Dams preferred stock was issued
to improve the company's balance sheet, with an understanding that the stock would be
redeemed when no longer needed. The court held that there was no business purpose
for the redemption.
35. 397 U.S. at 314. A Tax Court decision and a Revenue Ruling shed some light on
the effect Davis is having on stock redemptions. In Estate of William F Runnels, 54
T.C. 762 (1970), the court cites Davis in finding a redemption equivalent to a dividend,
but since the distribution was pro rata even without applying the attribution rules and
there was not a valid business purpose for the redemption, the result would have been
the same prior to the Davis decision.
However, in Rev. Rul. 70-496, 1970 InT. REv. BuLL. No. 39, at 6, the elimination of any
consideration of a business purpose test seems to require dividend treatment of sales of
stock among corporations controlled by a common parent.
36. The redemption of stock in a public corporation is seldom pro rata; even when
it is, the average stockholders' lack of control over the company's dividend policy argues
against a finding of dividend equivalency.
One commentator has come up with the interesting proposal that as section 302 was
intended to facilitate shifts in ownership among the shareholders of close corporations,
redemptions from public corporations should always be taxed as a dividend. This would
be justified by analogy to section 305(b) (1) where if a taxpayer has the option to take
stock or property he is taxed as if the distribution was a dividend. Chirelstem, Optional
Redemption and Optional Dividends: Taxing the Repurchase of Common Shares, 78 YALE
L.J. 739 (1969).
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non 302(b) (1) There appear to b-e two situations where a redemption
can still qualify under this section: a redemption that causes a "mean-
ingful reduction in a shareholder's proportionate interest," yet does not
qualify as a substantially disproportionate redemption under the pro-
vision of section 302(b) (2), and a redemption that would qualify as a
meaningful reduction of interest, but for the effect of the attribution
rules of section 318, if the taxpayer's situation is such that application of
the attribution rules is unwarranted.
Meaningful Reduction of Interest that Fails to Qualify Under Section
302 (b) (2)
As section 302(b) (5) provides that failure to qualify under section
302(b) (2) shall not affect determination under section 302(b) (1), it
seems clear that a meamngful reduction under section 302 (b) (1) is not
the same as a section 302(b) (2) substantially disproportionate redemp-
tion.s7 Thus, even with the business purpose of a redemption now
deemed irrelevant, those disproportionate redemptions that narrowly
fail the test of section 302 (b) (2) are prime candidates for qualification
under section 302 (b) (1) Other candidates are redemptions of preferred
stock, 'especially when the shareholder has no control over when the
redemption will occur,s and redemptions of the stock of minority share-
holders which, while not substantially disproportionate, leave the share-
holder with a very limited stake in the corporation."
37. Ir REv. CODE of 1954, § 302(b) (2), entitled "Substantially Disproportionate Re-
demption of Stock," provides a specfic objective test for deternning if a redemption will
qualify for capital gain treatment.
38. It was apparently this situation that caused the Senate Finance Committee to add
section 302(b) (1) to the House version of the bill which, m an effort to eliminate "the
considerable confusion which exists in this area," had provided the objective tests of
sections 302(b) (2) and 302(b) (3) but not the "essentially equivalent to a dividend" pro-
visions. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1954). The Senate Finance Com-
mittee report states:
While the House bill set forth defimte conditions under which stock may
be redeemed at capital gain rates, these rules appear unnecessarily restrictive,
particularly in the case of redemptions of preferred stock which might be
called by the corporation without the shareholder having any control over
when the redemption might take place. Accordingly, your committee fol-
lows existing law by reinserting the general language indicating that a re-
demption shall be treated as a distribution in part or full payment in ex-
change for the stock if the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a
dividend.
S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 24, at 44-45.
39. Rev. Rul. 56-183, 1956-1 CuM. BuILr. 161, rules that a reduction in ownership of
[Vol. 13.202
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An'important function of section 302(b) (1) should be to provide a
more liberal standard for redemption of preferred stock than is avail-
able in the strict and inflexible requirements of section, 302 (b) (2) A
preferred stock in a close corporation is normally a non-convertible
claim for a fixed amount, the value of which does notreflect the value
of retained earnings to the same extent as does commonstock. Preferred
tock does not provide the same opportunity as common stock to ex-
tract income via redemption at capital gains rates. If the redemption is
pro-rata, the common stockholder can extract income and still retain
his identical interest in the assets of the corporation. Thus, because of the
decreased opportunity for tax avoidance, the courts would be justified
in qualifying under section 302 (b) (1) a redemption of preferred stock,
vhile at the same time denying capital gain treatment to a redemption
of common stock even though the reduction of proportionate interest is
identical. 0
Inapplicability of Attribution Rules in a Conflict Situation
In Davis, the Supreme Court held that the attribution rules apply in
determining whether a redemption is essentially equivalent to a dividend
uifider section 302(b) (1) 41 The Court did not comment on whether a
family estrangement would create an exception to the application of'these
rules. Some commentators have said that Davis requires strict applica-
tion of the attribution rules in all cases. 42 As Davis did not involve any
estrangement, such a conclusion is neither necessary nor warranted.
A distribution to hostile adults that is pro-rata only because of the at-
tribution rules, is a clear example of a distribution that is "not essentially
equivalent to a dividend." 43 There is support for this position in the
legislative history of the Revenue Code, in the Treasury Regulations and
-in case law
The legislative history makes it clear that the policy behind the at-
stock from 11 to 9 percent was not equvalent to a dividend as the mnronty position
justified the characterization of. the transaction as a "sale."
40. See 84 HARv. L. RE v., supra note 19, at 240-41.
41. 397 U.S. at 307
-42. Note 19 supra.
43. See generally Moore, Dividend Equivalency-Taxation of Distribution m Re-
demptions of Stock, 19 TAx. L. Rxv. 249, 252-55 (1964); A. BERLiN & W Gornsmx, 17-
3d TAx MANAGEMENT, Corporate Stock Redemption A-33 (1970); Note, Stock Redemp-
tions from Close Family Corporations Under Section 302, 47 MrmN. L. REv. 853,. 867-70
(1963).
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tribution rules is the prevention of tax avoidance44 in situations where
one member of a family is able to control the stock owned by the other
members of the family or where a trust or estate is able to control the
stock owned by its beneficiaries. The attribution rules simply assist in
determining if an individual is merely a dummy stockholder "5 with no
influence in the control of the corporation. Prior to the enactment of
section 318, the Internal Revenue Service was occasionally successful
in persuading the courts to consider the relationship of the distributee to
the remaining shareholders. 46 In spite of the divorce trends, family har-
mony is still the normal situation and there is no reason why an individ-
ual should be able to escape adverse tax consequences merely by trans-
ferring a portion of his stock to his wife, while retaining practical con-
trol ove the power of the stock. But where, as in Herbert C. Parker,47
there is a history of sharp and continual disagreement between a father
and son concerning the proper operation of their company and because
of this conflict the son wished to buy out his father, there is no reason
and no justification for applying the attribution rules. This was the
reasoning of the Tax Court. Despite the fact that application of the at-
tribution rules would have resulted in less than one-half of one percent
reduction in the taxpayer's ownership, the court found that the redemp-
tion was not "essentially equivalent to a dividend."
The first circuit in 1962,48 while attributing a daughter's stock to her
father and as a result of this attribution finding dividend equivalency,
44. The Report of the House Ways and Means Committee states:
To prevent tax avoidance, but at the same time to provide a definite rule for
the guidance of taxpayers, your committee has provided precise standards
whereby under specific circumstances, a shareholder may be considered as
owmng stock held by members of his immediate family (or by partnerships,
corporations, or trusts which he controls).
H. RaP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1954). The Senate Finance Committee Report
states:
However, in order to prevent tax avoidance, your committee follows the
rules of the House bill whereby, under specific circumstances a shareholder
may be considered as owmng stock held by members of his family (or by
partnerships, corporations, or estates, trusts in which he has an interest).
S REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1954). See also J. MRTENS, Tim LAw oF FED-
FRAL INcoME TAxATiON, ConE COMMENTARY, § 318 at 114 (J. Malon ed. 1970).
45. See Lukens Estate v. Comm'r, 246 F.2d 403, 407 (3d Cir. 1957) (decided under
section 115(g) of the 1939 Code).
46. William H. Grimditch, 37 B.T.A. 402, 412 (1938). But see Lukens Estate v.
Comm'r, 246 F.2d 403, 407 (3d Cir. 1957).
47. 20 T.C.M. 893 (1961).
48. Bradbury v. Comm'r, 298 F.2d ill (1st Cir. 1962).
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qualified the use of the attribution rules and approved a flexible approach.
The court said:
While these attribution rules are generally applicable to section
302(b) (1), their imposition is not inflexible and if it can be
demonstrated that discord exists in a family relationship which
would make attribution unwarranted, they will not be applied.49
In support of its statement the court cited Estate of Arthur H. Squier"
wherein the Tax Court applied the attribution rules, but ignored their
effect because the redemption caused a significant increase in a minority
interest and, due to a sharp disagreement between the executor of the
estate and the beneficiaries, caused the estate to lose control of the cor-
poration. Thus, while the court applied the attribution rules, it chose to
ignore their effect in a situation where it considered attribution to be un-
warranted.
The argument for flexible imposition of these rules is further supported
by the regulations under section 302 which provide that constructive
ownership under section 318(a) is "onfe of the facts to be considered in
making" 51 a determination under section 302 (b) (1)
In Davis the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit by finding that the business purpose of a redemption was
not a relevant factor in deterrmning dividend equivalency Both the
lower courts52 had agreed that the attribution rules should apply to sec-
ton 302(b) (1), however, the court of appeals indicated in a footnote
that it regarded constructive ownership as merely a factor in determin-
ing whether a distribution is equivalent to a dividend. 3 The court indi-
cated that in a situation involving family estrangement it might be un-
reasonable to apply the attribution rules in a strict fashion. The Supreme
Court stated that the "taxpayer must be deemed the owner of all 1,000
49. Id. at 116-17 n.7
50. 35 T.C. 950 (1961).
51. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2 (b) (1960). Also m support of a flexible application of the
attribution rules is the statement in this same section of the regulations that: "The ques-
tion whether a distribution in redemption of stock of a shareholder is not essentially
equivalent to a dividend under section 302(b) (1) depends upon the facts and circum-
stances of each case."
52. Davis v. United States, 408 F.2d 1139, 1142-43 (6th Cir. 1969); Davis v. United
States, 274 F Supp. 466, 469 (M.D. Tenn. 1967).
53. 408 F.2d at 1142-43 n.6. "But, like the flexibility given to the strict net effect test,
there may be situations where it would be unrealistic to apply the attribution rules in
strict fashion, for instance in cases of family estrangement."
1971]
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shares of the company's common stock." 5' (emphasis supplied) How-
ever, as there was no estrangement in the Davis family, this statement can
be limited to the facts of the case.
Since the first and second circuits along with the Tax Court have
recognized the doctrine of estrangement on several occasions,55 and since
no other courts have expressly repudiated the doctrine, it seems to have
attained some validity, in precedent as well as in logic.
The very reasons that motivated the enactment of section 318 supply
the strongest arguments for not applying the attribution rules in map-
propriate situations. The rules rest on the assumption that one member
of a family can control the stock owned by other members of the family
and that it is proper to regard a member as holding all the shares pos-
sessed by his family Where this assumption is clearly erroneous there
should be no requirement to apply the attribution rules.
An inflexible application of the attribution rules in cases involving
family estrangement would be a victory of form over substance, a result
to which the Supreme Court has been unalterably opposed for many
54. 397 U.S. at 307
55. In Levin v. Comm'r, 385 F.2d 521, 527 (2d Cir. 1967), the court applied the at-
tribution rules from a son to a mother and then stated: 'We do not hold that there
may not be cases in which strict application of the attribution rules may be inappro-
priate family estrangement may render the application of the family attribution rules
unwise." Himmel v. Comm'r, 338 F.2d 815, 820 (2d Cir. 1964) applied the attribution
rules to aid the taxpayer in a constructive dividend test that determined that a redemp-
non was "not essentially equivalent to a dividend." However, at footnote 7 the court
stated: "We think it quite proper to be aware of the effect of a distribution on sig-
nificant corporate interests without strict regard to the attribution rules." Bradbury v.
Comm'r, 298 F.2d Ill (1st Cir. 1962) (discussed at note 48 supra). In Leon R. Meyer,
46 T.C. 65, 89 (1966), the Tax Court applied the attribution rules and found dividend
equivalency, but commented:
in this case there is no suggestion of a change in control or of any "sharp
cleavage" between the members of the Meyer family, which might tend to
diminish the significance of the attribution rules of section 318(a) (1) as a
factor in the consideration of whether a redemption is "not essentially equiv-
alent to a dividend.
Estate of Arthur H. Squier, 35 T.C. 950 (1961) (discussed note 50 supra); Herbert C.
Parker, 20 T.C.M. 893 (1961) (discussed note 47 supra); Perry S. Lewis, 47 T.C. 129,
133 (1966) (wherein while holding that the attribution rules should apply, the court
ignored their effect and found a redemption not essentially equivalent to a dividend).
The Tax Court's willingness to look behind the attribution rules and see the true re-
lationships does not always work to the taxpayer's advantage. In Ralph L. Humphry,
39 T.C. 199 (1962), the court chose to ignore the express requirement of section 318(a)
(2) (C) that a stockholder must own 50 percent or more of the value of stock of a cor-
poration before the ownership of stock owned by such corporation will be attributed
to him, and attributed the ownership of stock owned by a corporation in which the
stockholder was 44 percent owner resulting in the finding of dividend equivalency
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years.56 As Justice Frankfurter said in Griffiths v. Comnmssioner, "[w] e
cannot too often reiterate that 'taxation is not so much concerned with
the refinements of title as it is with actual command over the property
taxed. ,57
CONCLUSION
United States v. Dams has severely limited the availability of section
302 (b) (1), but it has not cancelled the section from the Code. Although
the case eliminates the use of a business purpose or other lack of tax
avoidance motive arguments as a basis for finding a distribution "not
essentially equivalent to a dividend," the section is still available for those
redemptions that fail to qualify for a safe harbor, but do cause a "mean-
ingful reduction of a shareholder's proportionate interest in a corpora-
tion." In determining the effect of a redemption, there is ample author-
ity and compelling reason to disregard the effect of the attribution rules
in Situations involving family estrangement or other conflicts that negate
the very assumptions on which the rules are based.
FRED K. MORRISON
56. Comm'r v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446, 461 (1959); Comm'r v. Court. Holding Co, 324
U.S. 331, 334 (1945); Helvering v. F & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252, 255 (1939); Bowers
v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 174 (1926); Weiss v. Steam 265 U.S. 242, 254
(1924); Umted States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 168 (1921).
57. 308 U.S. 355, 357 (1939).
